We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power. In lasting--but not in new--democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract rights. We show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights.
Introduction
What types of governments are most likely to have economic policies and institutions that generate good economic performance? There are examples of good--and of bad--economic performance under both autocratic and democratic governments. Many empirical studies have compared the economic performance of autocracies and democracies, but their conclusions are remarkably varied and inconclusive. We shall show here that it is naive to suppose that one of these types of political systems will regularly have better economic performance than the other.
The quality of economic policies and institutions depends partly on the incentives and constraints that face those who make governmental and legal decisions. These incentives and constraints vary from one autocracy to another and from one democracy to another. We contend that they vary so much within these two types of regimes that any empirical tests that merely distinguish governments as autocratic or democratic are bound to be misspecified. We show that, when appropriate distinctions are drawn within each of these two types of governments, clear and robust empirical findings emerge.
The importance of incentives within different types of governments becomes immediately evident when we think about the sometimes hoped-for benevolent dictator who understands (or who is guided by economic advisers who understand) the advantages of markets and uses them effectively to elicit economic growth through the rational self-interested behavior of his subjects. A moment's reflection reveals a methodological inconsistency: if the autocrat's subjects are supposed to be self-interested, we should impartially assume that the autocrat will also take his own interests into account. If he does, then whenever insecurity about his hold on power or anything else gives him a short time horizon, he will gain from expropriating any assets of his subjects whose tax yield to him over the short time horizon is less than their capital value. He will typically also gain resources by printing money to spend on his own purposes, thereby taxing real money balances through inflation, and by repudiating his debts. Such measures increase the resources he can use to attempt to keep himself in power or to serve his interests in other ways. There are countless examples throughout history of autocrats who have taken such measures. In such cases, the rational self-interest of an autocrat is inconsistent with the private property rights that are necessary for an effective market economy.
By contrast, a similarly rational and self-interested autocrat expecting to rule for a long time (and especially one with dynastic expectations) would gain from respecting--and even protecting--the property of his subjects. This would increase investment and future productivity and thus also his long-run tax collections. There are also many historical examples of autocrats who have served their long-run interests in this way.
Thus autocrats with different time horizons face dramatically different incentives. This means that we cannot correctly estimate the impact of autocratic government on economic performance without taking the time horizons of the individual autocrats into account. The empirical results in this paper suggest that this is a matter of some importance.
Consider now the factors that can endanger property and contract rights in a beginning democracy. Suppose the democratic debut involves nothing more than an election that gives victory to some political leader or optimizing party. When an elected leader has such power, it brings him benefits, so we cannot take it for granted that democratic leaders will be indifferent to whether or not they continue in power or that they will exercise their power without regard to their own interests. The elected leadership might maximize its chances for reelection by confiscating the assets of unpopular minorities or of the rich and distributing the proceeds among those from whom it hopes to obtain a majority in the next election. It might sometimes also improve its chances for staying in power by seizing opposing media, the assets of political opponents, or any firms or fortunes that are linked to its opponents.
Such measures terminate or at least endanger the democracy (and often are a sign that the current elected leader is on the way to becoming a dictator). They could not even be implemented if the democracy has courts that rigorously enforce the rule of law. But an initial election (however fair) does not by itself guarantee that there is an effective
